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Abstract
We investigate the problem of routing trafﬁc through a congested network in an environment of non-cooperative users. We use
the worst-case coordination ratio suggested by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou to measure the performance degradation due to
the lack of a centralized trafﬁc regulating authority. We provide a full characterization of the worst-case coordination ratio in the
restricted assignment and unrelated parallel links model. In particular, we quantify the tradeoff between the “negligibility” of the
trafﬁc controlled by each user and the worst-case coordination ratio.We analyze both pure and mixed strategies systems and identify
the range where their performance is similar.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
In most communication networks it is infeasible to maintain one centralized authority to route trafﬁc efﬁciently. As
a result, users may decide individually how to route their trafﬁc. Each user behaves selﬁshly in the sense that he wishes
to minimize his transmission cost while being aware of the network congestion caused by other users. A system of
users decisions is said to be in a Nash equilibrium if no user can beneﬁt from changing his decision. Simple examples
in game theory show that the performance of systems in Nash equilibrium, achieved by non-cooperative users, can be
far from the global optimum. Recently, the question of quantifying the decrease in network performance caused by
the lack of a centralized authority, received considerable attention among researchers. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[5,8] suggested to investigate the worst-case coordination ratio, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash
equilibrium and the global optimum, as a mean to understand the cost incurred due to the lack of a centralized regulating
authority.
Problems of this type have been studied lately by two approaches. The worst-case coordination ratio in a network
composed of m parallel related links was analyzed in [4,5,8], while making no assumptions on the relative amount
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of trafﬁc controlled by each user. On the other hand, [11,12] obtained improved bounds for general networks while
assuming that each user controls only a negligible fraction of the total trafﬁc. We attempt to bridge between these
two approaches, by analyzing the worst-case coordination ratio as a function of the relative fraction of the total trafﬁc
controlled by each user. Speciﬁcally, we quantify the required “negligibility” of each user’s trafﬁc, needed to bound
the worst-case coordination ratio by a constant.
We focus on two new models. First, we study the restricted assignment model (also called the subset model) which
is deﬁned as follows. The network consists of m parallel links. There are n users where user j has amount of trafﬁc wj ,
that can be transmitted through any link from a subset Mj of the m links. We consider both the pure strategies case
where each user selects one link to transmit his trafﬁc, and the more general case of mixed strategies where each user
decides a probability distribution over his allowable links. In both cases each user is aware of the decisions made by
other users. The cost incurred by each user is the total load on the link to which his trafﬁc is assigned. Since all users
behave selﬁshly, each wishes to minimize his cost by assigning his trafﬁc to the least loaded link. The global objective
however, is to minimize the load of the most loaded link. We note that even though this model is a simpliﬁcation of
real communication networks, it captures the essence of basic networking problems as pointed out by [5,6,8,11].
Additionally, we study the more general model of unrelated links in which a task j (j = 1, . . . , n) is associated
with an m-vector wj specifying its weight on each link. This model corresponds to a scenario in which the network
includes diverse links, and the trafﬁc generated by each task depends on the speciﬁc link used (e.g. network parameters
such as latency, error rate, bandwidth etc. have different inﬂuence over the amount of trafﬁc generated by different
network applications). We analyze the worst-case coordination ratio as a function of the maximum stretch s in the
system, where s = maxj,i,l:wij<∞(wij /wlj ).
1.2. Our results
We provide a full characterization of the worst-case coordination ratio for both pure and mixed strategies in the
restricted assignment and unrelated links models. Speciﬁcally, we prove the following results:
• We show the following tight bounds for the restricted assignment model, as functions of the ratio r between the
optimal assignment and the largest task (notice that r1):
◦ For 1r log mweprove that theworst-case coordination ratio is boundedby(log m/(r · log(2+(log m)/r)))
in the pure strategies case, and is bounded by (log m)/(r · log log(2 + (log m)/r))) in the mixed strategies
case.
◦ For any 0 <  < 1 and r = (log m/2) we show that the worst-case coordination ratio for both pure and mixed
strategies systems is bounded by 1 + .
Note that general bounds of(logm/log log m) for pure strategies and(logm/log log log m) formixed strategies
are obtained when r = 1, i.e. when making no assumptions on the largest task in the system. We also note that for
r = (log m) the worst-case coordination ratio is bounded by a constant, for both pure and mixed strategies.
• In the unrelated links model we prove that the worst-case coordination ratio is bounded by (s + (log m/
log(2 + (log m)/s))) in pure strategies systems, and ((s · log m/log log m) + (s · log m/ log(s · log(2 +
(log m)/s)))) when mixed strategies are allowed.
The paper most closely related to ours is [4], which provides tight bounds for the related links model. In this model
the links may have different speeds, each task is associated with a weight and can be assigned to any link, and the load
of each link equals the total amount of weight assigned to it divided by its speed. Note that this is also a special case
of the unrelated links model.
We follow the ideas in [4] and extend their results to the restricted assignment and unrelated links models, while
formulating the inﬂuence of additional important parameters on the worst-case coordination ratio. Our proofs mainly
rely on the techniques and ideas used in [4].
1.3. Related work
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [5] initiated the study of worst-case coordination ratio in networks composed of
m-parallel related links with possibly different speeds. They ﬁrst investigated the case of two links and proved a worst-
case coordination ratio of 32 for the case of identical links, and  = (1 +
√
5)/2 for links with possibly different
speeds. They also obtained non-tight bounds for the general case of m parallel links. Mavronicolas and Spirakis [6]
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continued this line of research while focusing on the special case of fully mixed strategies in which the probability of
assigning any task to any link is non-zero. They proved that in this case the worst-case coordination ratio is bounded
by (log m/log log m) for both the identical links model and the general related links model where all tasks have
equal weights and mn. Czumaj and Vöcking [4] proved tight bounds for the m-parallel related links model, and
showed that the worst-case coordination ratio is bounded by (log m/log log m) in the identical links model and by
(log m/log log log m) in the general related links model. Czumaj et al. [3] continued to study this problem and
characterized the coordination and bicriteria ratios for different families of cost functions.
Roughgarden et al. [10,12] also examined the degradation in network performance due to unregulated trafﬁc. Their
model deals with general networks where users adopt pure strategies only, and the amount of trafﬁc of each user is
assumed to be a negligible fraction of the total trafﬁc. The objective is to minimize the total latency. They proved that
when the latency of each edge is a linear function of the edge congestion, any ﬂow at Nash equilibrium has total latency
at most 43 of the optimal ﬂow. Although for general latency functions the worst-case coordination ratio is unbounded,
the following bicriteria result can be shown: for any network with continuous non-decreasing latency functions, a
ﬂow at Nash equilibrium has total latency no more than that of an optimal ﬂow forced to route twice as much trafﬁc.
Roughgarden [11] also showed that the cost of unregulated trafﬁc does not depend on the complexity of the network
topology. He also studied the impact of latency functions belonging to speciﬁc classes. Roughgarden et al. [1,2,9]
studied various ways to construct and price networks such that the cost incurred in unregulated trafﬁc is minimized.
1.4. Paper structure
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes formal deﬁnitions and notations. The restricted assignment
model is studied in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the unrelated links model.
2. Deﬁnitions and notations
The restricted assignment model is deﬁned as follows: there are m parallel links and n users, where user j (j =
1, . . . , n) has a task with weight wj , that can be assigned to any link from a subset Mj of the m links. We denote the
largest task in the system by wmax = max1 jn wj . Given an assignment of the tasks to the links, the load of each
link is deﬁned as the sum of the weights that are associated with the tasks being assigned to it. Given an instance of
the problem we deﬁne the global optimum (denoted by OPT ) to be the assignment of tasks to links that minimizes
the maximum load of a link. We denote the ratio between the value of the optimal solution and the largest task by
r = OPT/wmax. The unrelated links model is more general. Task j (j = 1, . . . , n) is associated with an m-vector wj ,
where wij indicates the weight of task j on link i.
We assume that the users are non-cooperative and each one wishes to minimize his own cost with no regard to the
global optimum. We consider two types of users strategies systems:
(1) Pure strategies: user j selects link lj ∈ Mj and assigns his task to it. Each user is aware of the choices made by all
other users when making his decision.
(2) Mixed strategies: user j selects a probability distribution {pij } (i ∈ Mj ) over the allowable set of links for task j.
Each user is aware of the probability distributions selected by all other users.
For the remainder of this section we regard pure strategies as a special case of mixed strategies, and give our deﬁnitions
in terms of mixed strategies systems. Given a system S of mixed strategies with probability distributions {pSij }, we
deﬁne the following random variables:
• A set of indicator random variables {XSij }, where XSij indicates whether task j is assigned to link i. By deﬁnition:
Pr[XSij = 1] = pSij .
• For each link i (i = 1, . . . , m) we deﬁne a random variable LSi , indicating the total load on the link: LSi =∑n
j=1 wj · XSij . We denote the maximum expected load by S = max1 im E[LSi ].
• We deﬁne a random variable LSmax = max1 im LSi to indicate the maximum link load, and denote its expectancy
by Smax = E[LSmax]. Clearly, SmaxS (for pure strategies Smax = S).
For simplicity of notation, throughout the paper we omit the superscript S when meaning is clear from context.
Deﬁnition 1. The expected cost of user j for assigning his task to link i in system S is deﬁned as: cSij = E[LSi |
XSij = 1] = E[LSi ] + (1 − pSij )wj .
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Deﬁnition 2. A system S is said to be in Nash Equilibrium if and only if for every task j and link i, pSij > 0 only if
cSij = min1km cSkj .
Deﬁnition 3. The worst-case coordination ratio of an instance of the problem is deﬁned as R = maxS Smax/OPT ,
where the maximum is taken over all strategies systems S in Nash equilibrium.
Throughout the paper we use the standard Gamma function deﬁned by (x) = ∫∞0 tx−1e−t dt . We also frequently
employ the following known equality for the inverse Gamma function: −1(m) = (1 + o(1))(log m/log log m).
3. Worst-case equilibria in the restricted assignment model
In this section we provide tight bounds for worst-case equilibria in the restricted assignment model. We investigate
both pure and mixed strategies. We ﬁrst show upper bounds for the problem, and then provide matching lower bounds.
3.1. Upper bounds for restricted assignment
We begin by proving an upper bound on the maximum expected load in any system in Nash equilibrium. Recall that
r = OPT/wmax; without loss of generality we assume that r is integral.
Lemma 4. Let S be any system in Nash equilibrium. Then S( + 1/r) · OPT , for some  that satisﬁes the
inequality e(/e)m1/r .
Proof. We order the links by non-increasing order of their expected loads. For every k1, deﬁne mk to be the minimal
integer such that E[Lmk+1] < k · wmax (mk = m if there is no such integer). We deﬁne l = S/wmax. Note that
ml1. The next claim, which is analogous to Claim 2.2 in [4], states an important property regarding the relation
between mk and mk+1.
Claim 5. For every k1, mk/mk+1(k + 1)/r .
Proof. Denote by Jk+1 the set of tasks with positive probability to be assigned to any link from [1, . . . , mk+1], and
denote the total weight of tasks from Jk+1 by W(Jk+1) = ∑j∈Jk+1 wj . Consider the way OPT schedules the tasks
from Jk+1. We claim that OPT cannot assign a task from Jk+1 to a link with index larger than mk . To prove this, let
us assume, for contradiction, that OPT assigns task j ∈ Jk+1 to link t > mk , and let pqj > 0 for some link qmk+1.
There follows:
cqj = E[Lq ] + (1 − pqj )wj (k + 1)wmax + (1 − pqj )wj (k + 1)wmaxk · wmax + (1 − ptj )wj > ctj ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of q and the third inequality results fromwj wmax (j = 1, . . . , n).
This contradicts the fact that the system S is in Nash equilibrium. Hence, OPT must assign all tasks from Jk+1 to links
in the range [1, . . . , mk]. Let LOPTi denote the load on link i in the optimal assignment. Recall that wmax = OPT/r .
We conclude that
mk · OPT
mk∑
i=1
LOPTi W(Jk+1)
mk+1∑
i=1
E[Li](k + 1)
(
OPT
r
)
mk+1,
which yields the desired inequality. 
We use Claim 5 iteratively together with the inequality (n!/k!)(n/e)n/(k/e)k to obtain the following:
mmr
l(l − 1) · · · (r + 1)
rl−r
= l!
r! · rl−r 
(l/e)l
(r/e)r · rl−r .
Substituting l =  · r we get: e(/e)m1/r and S(l + 1)OPT/r = (+ 1/r)OPT . 
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3.1.1. Pure strategies
In the following theorem we show an upper bound on the worst-case coordination ratio as a function of the ratio r
between the optimal solution and the largest task in the system.
Theorem 6. For pure strategies, when 1r log m,R = O(log m/(r · log(2 + (log m)/r))).
Proof. Since Smax = S for pure strategies, and given the inequality stated in Lemma 4, it sufﬁces to bound the value
of  in order to prove the theorem. Applying Stirling’s formula to the inequality from Lemma 4 we have
m1/re
(

e
)
= (1 + o(1)) e !√
2
,
and therefore (1 + o(1))−1(m 1r ) = O(log m/(r · log(2 + (log m)/r))). The theorem follows. 
As a direct result from Theorem 6, we obtain the following general upper bounds for two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst
case we make no assumptions regarding the amount of trafﬁc controlled by each user, namely, the largest task may be
as large as the optimal solution, i.e. r = 1. In the second case the tasks are relatively small, i.e. r = (log m).
Corollary 7. For pure strategies, R = O(log m/log log m).
Corollary 8. For pure strategies, when r = (log m), we have R = O(1).
Next, we study the worst-case coordination ratio in networks where each user controls a small fraction of the
total trafﬁc, i.e. r = (log m). The next theorem shows that in such networks the worst-case coordination ratio is close
to 1.
Theorem 9. For any 0 <  < 1, if r = (log m/2), then R1 + .
Proof. From Lemma 4 we know that R + 1/r where  satisﬁes the inequality: e(/e)m1/r . When taking
r = (log m/2) we obtain using Taylor expansion:
eO(
2)m1/re
(

e
)
= e 12 (−1)2−O((−1)3),
and the inequality yields R+ 1
r
1 + . 
3.1.2. Mixed strategies
The following theorem gives an upper bound on the worst-case coordination ratio for the mixed strategies case. Its
proof employs the techniques used in the proof of Theorem 1.1 in [4].
Theorem 10. For mixed strategies, when 1r log m, R = O(log m/(r · log log(2 + (log m)/r))).
Proof. For convenience we scale the tasks weights such that wmax = 1. Consider an arbitrary link i. Recall that
Li = ∑nj=1 wjXij , where wj wmax = 1 for j = 1, . . . , n, and  = max1 im E[Li]. We apply Hoeffding
inequality 3 and obtain for every c > 1:
Pr[Lic · ]
(
e · E[Li]
c · 
)c·

(
e · 
c · 
)c·
=
(e
c
)c·
.
3 We use the following version of Hoeffding inequality: Let {Xi }Ni=1 be independent random variables with values in [0, z], and letX =
∑N
i=1 Xi .
Then Pr[X t] (e · E[X]/t)t/z.
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We can now apply the union bound to obtain: Pr[Lmaxc · ]m(e/c)c·. For every integer  > 10 we can upper
bound the expected maximum load by:
max · +  ·
∞∑
k=
Pr[Lmaxk · ] · + m · 
∞∑
k=
(e/k)k· · + (2 + 1/) · m · (e/)·,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the sequence is sub-geometric.We can substitute  for −1(m1/)+
d, for a sufﬁciently large constant d. We then have: (e/)·1/m, hence max( + 2 + 1/). Since  =
O(log m/( · log((log m)/))) there follows: max = O(log m/log((log m)/)). Since OPT = r , Lemma 4
together with the proof of Theorem 6 imply that  = O(log m/log(2 + (log m)/r)), substituting  we conclude
that max = O(log m/log log(2 + (log m)/r)) and therefore R = O(log m/(r · log log(2 + (log m)/r))). 
The following upper bounds for two extreme cases are derived directly from Theorem 10.
Corollary 11. In the restricted assignment problem R = O(log m/log log log m).
Corollary 12. When r = (log m) we have R = O(1).
The next theorem refers to networks where each user controls a small fraction of the total trafﬁc.
Theorem 13. For any 0 <  < 1, if r = (log m/2), then R1 + .
Proof. For convenience we scale the tasks weights such that wmax = 1, hence OPT = r . We distinguish between two
cases. First, assume that OPT . By the Hoeffding bound, 4 for every 1 im, and 0 <  < 1:
Pr[Li(1 + /3)]Pr[Li + (− E[Li])(1 + /3) ]e−2/27m−3,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows since  − E[Li]0, the second inequality results from the fact that E[Li + ( −
E[Li]) ] = , and the last inequality follows since OPT = r . By applying the union bound, with high probability
Lmax(1+ /3) and therefore max(1+ /3+ o(1)). By using Theorem 9 with /3 we conclude that max(1+
/3 + o(1))(1 + /3)OPT(1 + )OPT and the theorem follows. The case of  < OPT is handled by using the same
analysis while replacing  by OPT . 
3.2. Lower bounds for restricted assignment
We begin by proving a tight lower bound for the pure strategies case, and then extend it to the mixed strategies case.
Our constructions are similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1.3 in [4].We note that our lower bounds are proved
even for unit weight tasks.
Theorem 14. For pure strategies, R = (log m/(r · log(2 + (log m)/r))).
Proof. We construct the following problem instance:
Links: we allocate l + 1 link groups among the m links (the value of l will be determined later) such that in group
k = 0, . . . , l there are √ml!/rl · rk/k! links. Denote the number of links in group k by nk .
Tasks: we partition the tasks into l groups. In group k = 1, . . . , l there are k · nk unit weight tasks, each can be
assigned to any link from groups [k − 1, . . . , l].
Observe that OPTr +1 for this problem instance. The optimal solution assigns the tasks of group k (k = 1, . . . , l)
to the links in group k − 1, at most r + 1 tasks per link. We deﬁne the following system of pure strategies, denoted by
S: all tasks from group k (k = 1, . . . , l) are assigned to links from group k, k tasks per link.
Claim 15. The system S is in Nash equilibrium.
4 We use the following Hoeffding bound which generalizes the Chernoff bound: Let {Xi }Ni=1 be independent random variables (not necessarily
from the same distribution), such that eachXi takes a value of 0 or zi 1.Then forX =
∑N
i=1 Xi , and 0 < 1, Pr[X (1+)E[X]]e−
2E[X]/3
.
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Proof. Denote by Mk (k = 1, . . . , l) the set of links to which tasks from task group k can be assigned. Let j be a task
from group k and consider the assignment of j to link i from link group k. Clearly, cij = k, and for each link t ∈ Mk
we have ctj (k − 1) + 1 = kcij . Hence the system S is in Nash equilibrium. 
We now turn to bound the coordination ratio. We should satisfy the inequality
√
m · (l!/rl)∑lk=1(rk/k!)m. Since
er
∑l
k=1(rk/k!), it will sufﬁce if the following inequality holds:
√
m · l!
rl
· er = √m · (1 + o(1))
√
2l · (l/e)l
rl
· erm. (*)
By taking l = r , we conclude that R = (l/r) = () = (log m/(r log(2 + (log m)/r))). 
By substituting r = O(log m/2) in the inequality (*) above we derive a tight lower bound (for pure and mixed
strategies) for the case where each user controls a small fraction of the total trafﬁc.
Corollary 16. For any 0 <  < 1, if r = O(log m/2), then R1 + .
We can modify our construction from Theorem 14 to obtain a tight lower bound for the mixed strategies case.
Theorem 17. For mixed strategies, R = (log m/(r · log log(2 + (log m)/r))).
Proof. We slightly modify the problem instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 14. Everything remains the same
except task group l now contains (l − 1) · nl tasks. Clearly, OPTr + 1. We introduce the following system of mixed
strategies, denote it by S:
• All tasks from group k (k = 1, . . . , l − 1) are assigned to links from group k, k tasks per link (the same as the
construction in the proof of Theorem 14).
• Each task from group l has uniform distribution over the links from group l.
We ﬁrst prove that the system S is in Nash equilibrium.
Claim 18. The system S is in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The cost of task j from group l on any link i in group l is: cij = (l − 1) + (1 − 1/√m). On the other hand, for
any link t not in group l: ctj = (l − 1)+ 1 > cij . The proof concerning tasks from groups [1, . . . , l − 1] is identical to
the proof given in Claim 15. 
In the following claim we determine a lower bound on Smax.
Claim 19. Smax = (log m/log log(2 + (log m)/r)).
Proof. Consider the assignment of tasks to links in group l. There are (l−1) ·√m unit weight tasks each with uniform
distribution over the
√
m links. This corresponds to a model of throwing (l − 1) ·√m balls uniformly at random to √m
bins (see e.g. [7]). In this model the expected maximum occupancy is (l + (log m/log((log m)/l))). In our case this
lower bound corresponds to Smax = (log m/log log(2 + (log m)/r)). 
Since OPTr + 1, our lower bound on the worst-case coordination ratio in the case of mixed strategies follows
directly from Claim 19. 
4. Analysis of the unrelated links model
Recall that in the unrelated links model, a task j is associated with an m-vector wj = (w1j , . . . , wmj ) specifying its
weight on each link. Clearly, this model generalizes the restricted assignment model. We deﬁne the maximum stretch
in the system as s = maxj,i,l:wij<∞(wij /wlj ). In the next sections we show tight bounds for pure and mixed strategies
as functions of s. Note that by increasing s the worst-case coordination ratio becomes arbitrarily large.
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4.1. Upper bounds for the unrelated links model
We begin by proving an upper bound on the maximum expected load in any system in Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 20. Let S be a system in Nash equilibrium. Then
S = O
(
s + log m
log(2 + (log m)/s)
)
· OPT .
Proof. We order the links by non-increasing order of their expected loads. For every k1, deﬁne mk to be the minimal
integer such that E[Lmk+1] < k · OPT (mk = m if there is no such integer). Let h = S/OPT. The following claim
shows a relation between mk and mk+1.
Claim 21. For every k1, mk/mk+1(k + 1)/s.
Proof. Denote by Jk+1 the set of tasks assigned by S with positive probability to a link from [1, . . . , mk+1]. Suppose
that there is a task j ∈ Jk+1 which is assigned by OPT to a link t > mk , and let qmk+1 be a link to which j is
assigned by S with positive probability. Then,
cqj (k + 1) · OPTk · OPT + (1 − ptj )wtj > ctj ,
contradicting the assumption that S is in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, all the tasks in Jk+1 are assigned by OPT to
links from [1, . . . , mk]. Hence,
mk · OPT 
mk∑
i=1
LOPTi 
∑
j∈Jk+1
min
1 im
wij 
∑
j∈Jk+1
∑mk+1
i=1 p
S
ij · wij
s
=
∑mk+1
i=1 E[LSi ]
s
 (k + 1) · OPT
s
· mk+1,
and the claim follows. 
Now, if hs then we are done. Otherwise, using Claim 21 we obtain that
mms
h(h − 1) · · · (s + 1)
sh−s
= h!
s! · sh−s 
(
h
e1−s/hs
)h
.
By applying the analysis used in the proof of Theorem 6, it follows that h = O(log m/log(2 + (log m)/s)). 
The next two theorems bound the worst-case coordination ratio for pure and mixed strategies. Theorem 22 follows
directly from Lemma 20.
Theorem 22. For pure strategies R = O(s + (log m/log(2 + (log m)/s))).
Theorem 23. For mixed strategies R = O((s · log m/log log m) + (s · log m/log(s · log(2 + (log m)/s)))).
Proof. The proof follows the same analysis used in the proof of Theorem 10, hence we indicate only the differences.
We begin by scaling the tasks weights such that OPT = 1. Notice that as a consequence wij s for any 1 im
and 1jn. Using Hoeffding inequality we derive that Pr[Lic · ](e/c)c·/s for every c > 1, and by the same
analysis as in Theorem 10 we obtain that max · + (2+ 1/) ·m · (e/)·/s , for every integer  > 10. By taking
 = −1(ms/)+d, for some sufﬁciently large constant d, and plugging in the bound on  from Lemma 20, the desired
bound is obtained. 
4.2. Lower bounds for the unrelated links model
In this section we show lower bounds that match the upper bounds proved in Section 4.1.
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Theorem 24. For pure strategies, R = (s + (log m/log(2 + (log m)/s))).
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing two instances of the problem. Without loss of generality we assume that
s is integral.
We ﬁrst assume that s log m. We give a construction similar to the one in Theorem 14: we partition the links
into Ks + 1 groups, where K−1(m1/3s). For k = 0, . . . , K − 1 and i = 1, . . . , s, group number ks + i contains
nks+i = √m · (K!)s/((k!)s(k + 1)i) links, and group 0 contains n0 = m −∑Ksl=1 nl links. Note that
√
m · (K!)s +
Ks∑
l=1
nl
√
m · (K!)s + √m ·
K−1∑
k=0
s
(K!)s
(k!)s 
√
m · (K!)s(1 + es)m,
so n0
√
m · (K!)s .
The tasks are partitioned into Ks groups. For k = 0, . . . , K − 1 and i = 1, . . . , s, the (ks + i)th group contains
(k + 1) · nks+i tasks. Each task in that group has weight 1 on a link from group ks + i − 1, weight s − (s − i)/(k + 1)
on a link from group ks + i, and inﬁnite weight on all other links.
The optimal assignment is to assign each task from the lth group of tasks to a distinct link in the (l − 1)th group of
links. Thus, OPT = 1. Now, consider the following system S of pure strategies: the tasks of the lth group of tasks are
evenly divided between the links of the lth group of links. Clearly, the load on a link from the lth group is exactly l for
l1, and in particular, the maximum load is Ks.
The system S is in Nash equilibrium: for a task j from the lth group that was assign to a link i, we have that
cij = l, and for any link k 	= i, ckj (l − 1) + 1 = l. Therefore, the coordination ratio is (Ks). Since we can take
K = (log m/(s · log(2 + (log m)/s))), it follows that R = (log m/log(2 + (log m)/s)).
We now handle the case when s = (log m). Consider the following problem instance: there are m tasks, where
task j has weight 1 on link j, weight s on link (j + 1) mod m, and inﬁnite weight on any other link (assume the links
are numbered [0, . . . , m − 1]).
Clearly, OPT = 1 by assigning task j to link j (j = 0, . . . , m − 1). Consider the system of pure strategies S where
task j is assigned to link ((j + 1) mod m). Clearly, the system S is in Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the load on each
link is s. Hence, the coordination ratio is (s). 
Theorem 25. For mixed strategies, R = ((s · log m/log log m) + (s · log m/log(s · log(2 + (log m)/s)))).
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing two instances of the problem. Without loss of generality we assume that
s is integral.
We ﬁrst assume that s log m. We use the ﬁrst problem instance from the proof of Theorem 24 with the following
slight modiﬁcation: each task that belongs to group 1 l = ks + iKs − 1 has weight 2 on any link from group
l − 1 and weight 2s − 2(s − i)/(k + 1) on any link from group l. Observe that OPT = 2, by assigning each task
from the lth group of tasks to a distinct link in the (l − 1)th group of links. Now, consider the following system S
of mixed strategies: For 1 lKs − 1, the tasks of the lth group are evenly divided between the links of the lth
group of links. All tasks belonging to group Ks have uniform distribution over the links of group Ks. It can be easily
veriﬁed that the system S is in Nash equilibrium. Note that the assignment of tasks to links in group Ks corresponds to
throwing K · √m balls (of size s) uniformly at random to √m bins. In this model the expected maximum occupancy is
(K+log m/log((log m)/K)). Sincewe can takeK = (log m/(s · log(2 + (log m)/s))), it follows thatRSmax/2
= (s · log m/log(s · log(2 + (log m)/s))).
Next, we handle the case when s = (log m), and construct the following problem instance:
Links: we partition the m links into two groups, denoted M1 and M2, each consisting of m/2 links.
Tasks: we have two task groups, J1 and J2, each consisting of m/2 tasks. The weight vectors of the tasks are deﬁned
as follows. Task j (j = 0, . . . , m/2 − 1) from group J1 has weight s on all links of group M1, weight 1 on link j from
group M2, and inﬁnite weight on all other links. Task j (j = 0, . . . , m/2 − 1) from group J2 has weight 2 on link j
from group M2, weight 2s on all other links in M2, and inﬁnite weight on all links of group M1.
Observe that OPT = 3, by assigning task j from group J1 together with task j from group J2 to link j in group M2.
Now consider the following system of mixed strategies, denoted by S. Each task from group J1 has uniform distribution
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over the links of groupM1, and task j from group J2 is assigned (with probability 1) to link ((j +1) mod m/2) in group
M2. It can be easily veriﬁed that the system S is in Nash equilibrium. Since the assignment of tasks from group J1 to
link group M1 corresponds to throwing m/2 balls (of size s) to m/2 bins, we conclude that RSmax/3 = (s · log m/
log log m). 
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